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8. Reform 17th – 18th Century
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وعلى ءاله وصحبه أجمعين وسلّم
Title: Reform 17th-18th Century
Author: Abdalhakim Andersson
Publication date: 23/03/2013
Lecture 8: Reform 17th – 18th Century
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وعلى ءاله وصحبه أجمعين
Welcome to the Muslim History Programme of the MFAS. This is the eighth of 12 sessions which make up the second module, The Madhhabs of Islam. The lecture will last approximately 40 minutes during which time you should make a written note of any questions that may occur to you for clarification after the lecture.
In the second lecture of this course, we referred to Ibn Khaldun’s concept of as-sanad fi-ta’lim, the chain of instruction, as one of the main features of the madhhabs and of Islamic scholarship throughout history. The two upcoming lectures will examine the reform movements from the 17th century onwards, all of which sought to revive Islamic scholarship and apply it to their socio-political contexts, wether by opposing or making use of the traditional chain of instruction, that is, the institution of the four madhhabs. The first lecture will focus on the 17th and 18th centuries, including a wide range of movements and scholars, such as Shah Wali Allah of India, Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab of Arabia and ‘Uthman don Fodio of West Africa, among others. These movements might appear as opposites of the second phase of reform from the 19th century onwards, which to a larger degree was formed by the encounter with European modernity. The relationship between the two phases is, however, far more complicated.
Rather than dividing them into two opposites, we will discuss them in terms of chronology and cultural context as (1) reform before the cultural impact of modernity and (2) reform after, and in response to, the cultural and technological impact of modernity. Another factor that divides the two epochs of is the regional versus universal focus; the early movements being regional in character and the later movements being universal in their claims. The exception to this, as we shall see, is the Wahhabi movement. Because of its exceptional development into a universal reform of the Muslim community, with far-reaching political implications, this movement will be the main focus of the present lecture.
Our aim is to highlight the similarities as well as differences between the early and later reform movements by looking at their responses to the challenges of their times. Particular attention will be directed towards the implications of their different focuses on law or belief and on regional or universal reform, as well as their long-term effects on scholarship, politics, economics and social circumstances in the Muslim world. By focusing on the influences behind their ideas and their socio-political effects, we will avoid evaluating their aspirations in favour of questions regarding the intellectual, political and socio-economic contexts in which they arose and spread.
2. Classification and terminology
Firstly, however, we will discuss some theoretical considerations pertaining to classification and terminology. In this context, the term reform refers to ideas, actions or processes of making changes in order to improve, usually in relation to political, social, economic and/or intellectual institutions and practices. The Arabic term for reform, islah, was used by some movements towards the end of the 19th century, but in this context, the term reform is used generally as the lowest common denominator of the various movements that called for reform of Muslim individuals as well as societies by means of scholarship.
Western scholarship have traditionally viewed the eighteenth century as a period of political, economic and intellectual stagnation in the Muslim lands, followed by two centuries of political and intellectual revival, primarily as a result of growing European influence.1 Thus, reactions and responses to European influence are seen as the main criteria for defining Islamic reform.2 The focus exclusively on responses to the challenges of European modernity privileges these intellectual activities over other factors involved, while promoting a static view of Islamic societies as the passive other of Europe. In fact, the idea of economic and political decline has been discredited by recent studies, particularly by historians of the Osmanli caliphate.3 Without denying the decisive changes that took place in Muslim lands in the period and the leading role of European states in shaping world politics, a considered examination of the emergence of Islamic reformism must look beyond the paradigm of decline and reform in response to European impact. To widen our perspectives and locate these movements in the history of Islamic thought, we will begin with a brief overview of the historical movements that preceded the reform of the 17th and 18th centuries.
3. Examples of pre-modern reform movements
Ideologies based on the idea of reform can be found from the earliest history of Islam. These tendencies encompass a variety movements that originated either as political or theological reform. Despite different origins, many nevertheless developed into movements organised around both political and religious doctrines. Without discussing their characteristics in detail, some examples of the early reform movements are:
1. The Khawarij, which was the earliest sect that separated itself from the main body of Muslims and declared war on all who disagreed with them, stating that wrong actions turn a Muslim into an unbeliever. Their ideology was based on takfir, accusing others of disbelief, and a call for return to the basic principles of Islam – the Book of Allah and the Sunna – which in their view had been abandoned by the Muslim community. They also propagated a far-reaching democratisation of the leadership of Islam, insisting that any Muslim could be leader of the community and that they had the right to revolt against any ruler who deviated from their interpretation of Islam. The sect originated during the first civil war (fitna) among the Muslims, when they left the caliphal army of ‘Ali b. Abi Talib and rebelled against his leadership. Their ideology was adopted by many different movements during the Umayyad and ’Abbasid periods, but never achieved any organised political success, although a branch from this ideology remains today among the so called al-Ibadiyya (Ibadism).
2. The early Shi’a movements, which consisted of different more or less organised parties which claimed that ‘Ali should have succeeded as the first caliph and that the legitimate leadership of the Muslim community belongs to his descendants. During the Umayyad period, these movements emerged as reformers, insisting that social and religious justice could only be restored by the leadership of the ahl al-bayt. The Shi’a groups often contributed to political change, such as the ‘Abbasid takeover, but did not establish real political authority until the Isma’ili dynasty of Egypt and the Safavid dynasty in Persia. For our purposes here, we note that they, as with the Khawarij, begun as political opposition, but soon developed distinct theological doctrines.
3. Isma’ilism, which was an esoteric (batini) branch of the Shi’a that became the state ideology of the Fatimid dynasty of North Africa from 296/909 to 566/1171. It originated alongside other Shi’a groupings, but was distinguished by political rebellions against the established order, articulating their call for social and religious reform by their esoteric ideology.
4. The Mu’tazila, which did not originate as a political movement to the same degree as the earlier sects, but had a great impact on political history. Their approach to reform of Muslim society in the face of political and intellectual challenges in the ‘Abbasid period was characterised by a far-reaching rationalism and re-thinking of the traditionally transmitted ways of Muslim scholarship.
5. Al-Muwahhidun, which was a Moroccan movement of the 6th/12th century initially led by Ibn Tumart who called for political and religious reform, criticising the decadence of the society under the ruling dynasty of the Murabitun. Their activities were also characterised by opposition to the Maliki madhhab in the West in favour of a strict literalism, in line with the Dhahiri school of fiqh.
6. Revivalism after the Mongol invasions, which, by various means both within and outwith the institutions of the madhhabs, sought to revive the Muslim community after years of decline. Among the most important for later reform movements were the Hanbali scholars, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 661/1263) and Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 691/1292), who reinterpreted the legacy of their madhhab, in response to external as well as internal challenges.
Thus, the historical reoccurrence of reform movements, claiming to return to the primal sources of the Book and the Sunna, indicates that the 18th century movements were not a new phenomena in Islamic history, although the characteristics of each movement has been formed by their particular context. Although other movements and tendencies are worth mentioning, the aforementioned provide a background that shows the historical recurrence of reform movements at times of internal and external threats to the Muslim community.
When we look at the early modern reform movements from the 17th century onwards, our first point of departure is the Kadizadeli movement in the Osmanli caliphate, which began in the 16th century. In our previous course, History of the Khalifas, Mehmet Currie observed:
From around the 1630s until the 1680s, the Kadızadeli movement had been a powerful force in the Ottoman political scene. The Kadızadeli movement had developed in response to growing religious innovation and state corruption. The Kadızadeli vision to eliminate religious innovation was remarkably similar, in many ways identical, to that of Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab, although preceding it by some 50-100 years. The targets of the Kadızadeli polemic were certain Sufi groups, who the Kadızadelis viewed as transgressing the boundaries of the Shariah. The Kadızadeli message against religious innovation became championed by many of Istanbul's preachers, who disseminated and popularised the uncompromising message through their fierce sermons to the lay public. At times, particularly during the 1650s, the peace of the land was threatened by confrontations between Kadızadeli and Sufi factions, causing concern and consternation for those in positions of governance. The dispute divided society at all levels, from the most powerful Ottoman scholars, to the mosque preachers, to the layman on the street. Although the Kadızadeli movement was politically weakened and suppressed following the disastrous Ottoman defeat in Vienna in 1683, their dispute was never actually resolved, with precisely the same key issues and contentions being raised some 50 years later by Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab.4
Some of the main issues of religious controversy that the Kadızadeli reacted against were:
1. the nature of religious innovations (bid’a)
2. visiting graves
3. music and singing
4. Dawarân (whirling), raqs (dancing) and sama’ (spiritual audition)
5. the manner of performing dhikr (e.g. quiet versus aloud)
6. the controversies concerning Muhyi ad-Din b. ‘Arabi and Wahdat al-Wujud
7. the study of rational sciences (including logic, philosophy and kalam sciences)5
Alongside these disputes about innovations, prohibitions and theological doctrines, the Kadızadeli also addressed social issues and condemned widespread practices such as coffee consumption, tobacco smoking and bribery. But the question of innovation was nevertheless central, emerging as it were from the growing tension pertaining to certain Sufi practices and beliefs in the Osmanli society. The origins of the Kadızadeli movement can be traced back to Imam Birgivi (d. 1573), who wrote a number of works dealing with the highly topical issues of sufism in Osmanli society and religious innovations, which show clear influences from Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya and Ibn Taymiyya. The teachings of Imam Birgivi were popularised by Kadızade Mehmed Efendi, who gave name to the Kadızadeli movement. He became famous as a mosque preacher (wâ‘idh) and for his polemics against those he perceived as outside the boundaries of orthodoxy, particularly sufi groups. He also wrote numerous works on topics such as jurisprudence, faith, governance, innovations and rectification of social corruption. In fact, the issue of religious innovation among some sufi groups and social corruption arising from the Janissary troops, indicates the context in which the movement has to be understood. Although the paradigm of decline and reaction is too simplistic, it is clear that the political and economic transformations that modernity brought about, alongside religious deviations, provided a fertile context for actions and reactions to these changes.
After the death of Kadızade, Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Ustuwani became the next leader of the movement around the 1650’s and he is important since his scholarship can be linked to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab by various isnads from in the Hanbali circles of Damascus. By this time, the movement had attracted many followers who participated in the open quarrels that occurred between the Kadizadelis and their opponents. Similarly to the later popularisation of the teachings of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the preachings of the Kadizadeli scholars stirred violent actions and reactions among laymen, which led to open conflicts between increasingly divided groups of Muslims.
The defeat of Vienna in 1683 became a turning point for the Kadızadeli movement, marking the fall of their political influence in the Osmanli society. As the reform lost influence in the Turkish lands, however, the influence increased abroad and Damascus became a new stronghold. The ideas caused great scholarly debates, such as those between ‘Abd al-Ghani an-Nablusi and Sun’Allah al-Halabi, among others. It also caused social upheaval like the violent riots in Cairo in 1711. Some years earlier, in 1703, Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab was born in Najd. It was in this region of the Arabian Peninsula, quite removed from the heartlands of the Osmanli caliphate, that his movement later originated.
4.2. Other 17/18th century movements
The traditional view based on the decline-reaction paradigm tend to describe the Wahhabi movement as representative of Muslim revival in the 17th/18th century. Although the history of early Islamic reform is more complex, the Wahhabi phenomena was arguably the most influential in the years to come. But in addition to its links to the Kadizadeli movement, it is important to look at the other trends before going into details of the Wahhabi reform. Characterising these early movements, recent scholarly works have emphasised the socio-political usage of scholarship, in particular hadith, rather than the details of the scholarly debates themselves.6 As the political and economic circumstances were changing in Muslim societies, scholars became aware of the need to reorganise the function of the traditional sciences. The ideas and activities of these scholars created some general trends of Islamic reform, most notably represented by the following seven:
1. Muhammad b. Isma’il al-Amîr as-San’âni (d. 1769) of Yemen
2. Shah Wali Allah (d. 1762) of India
3. Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) of Arabia
4. ‘Uthman don Fodio (d. 1817) of West Africa
5. Muhammad b. ‘Ali ash-Shawkâni (d. 1834) of Yemen
6. Ahmad b. Idris (d. 1837) of North Africa
7. Muhammad b. ‘Ali as-Sanûsi (d. 1859) of North Africa
Despite the apparent diversity, what links the movements together is their transformative approach to scholarship and their self-confident, rather than utopian, socio-political engagement. They also shared a concern for local unification of Muslim communities, often expressed by referring to a return to the primal sources of the Qur’an and Sunna, if necessary beyond the four madhhabs. In terms of scholarly and political impact, the movements of all seven personalities were successful, although the Wahhabi movement has been given most attention in later times. One may also add that none of the movements were primarily reacting against European modernity, although obviously aware of its impact in the colonial period. Rather, they responded to internal stagnation and decline in certain Muslim societies. It becomes clear in comparison with later trends of Islamic reform, which tended to either reject European thought and politics, or facilitate a compromise by adopting its institutions and modes of thought.
4.3. Regional and universal reform
When comparing the first phase of reform to the second phase of the 19th century onwards, one of the main differences it that the earlier movements were regional in their activities. Later movements, on the other hand, were universal in their reform of the religious and political state of the Muslim community. Moreover, it is the universal claim that separates the Wahhabi movement from other early movements, although the Wahhabi movement began as a regional reform. Most 18th century reformers sought political and social renewal by means of the traditional legacy of Islamic scholarship, despite obvious re-interpretations and re-arrangements of its material. As Dallal describes the reform of ‘Uthman don Fodio, he “sought not to reform the content of Islamic education, but to employ it in the reformation of his own local context.”7 They also focused mainly on legal, moral and political reform of local circumstances by means of the traditional material, rather than issues pertaining to belief. They were therefore essentially regional in character and did not articulate universal pretensions to change Islamic scholarship in itself.
The Wahhabi movement, however, developed beyond the initial stage of regional reform in the Arabian peninsula. It soon turned into a reform of the whole scholarly tradition, not only including law, as had been the case with the Kadızadelis, but also belief. By reviving the political usage of takfir, previously associated with the Khawarij, and the claim to represent a primal Islam of the Book and the Sunna, Wahhabism became a world-wide political and scholarly force. It is this universal and monocultural turn of the Wahhabi reform, appearing alongside the cultural impact of European modernity in the Muslim lands, that connects it to the second phase of the 19th century onwards.
The notion of Islam as a uniform religion is fundamentally a modern concept, formed within the framework of modern technology and the discourse of global politics and identities. Although all Muslims share the core tenets of belief, natural differences in legal, political and spiritual practice used to characterise the Muslim community in the caliphal period. The early tajdid movements, such as that of ‘Uthman don Fodio, sought to reform and bring unity to local contexts by means of traditional scholarship. The later modernist movements, however, sought to unite the Muslims by one form of Islam, based their interpretation of the Book and the Sunna. By overlooking regional circumstances and differences of opinion, in itself one of the main characteristics of the first generations of Muslims, the later movements responded to the globalisation of European monoculture by forming an Islamic equivalent. Before reaching that stage, the reform of Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab developed in relation to the religious and political circumstances of the Arabian Peninsula, although influences from elsewhere gave it its particular characteristics. To understand present-day Wahhabism and its various so called Salafi off-shoots, we will therefore return to the 18th century.
The movement of Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab began in the 1740s, when he started to preach his doctrine of tawhid against what he claimed to be the spread of shirk in the Arabian Peninsula. Some years later, he received political support form the Sa‘ud family, who used the Wahhabi ideology for their political appropriation of different parts of Arabia. The works of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab are mainly devoted to his concept of tawhid, including classifications of believers and unbelievers. Unlike other 18th century reformist thinkers, socio-political concerns appear marginal to his agenda. As the historical development proved, however, the focus on issues of belief and measures against hidden idolaters strengthened the political cause of the Sa‘ud family, which in turn paved the way for the global spread of the Wahhabi ideology. Dallal notes:
His enemies were Muslims who held wrong beliefs about God, not tyrants who oppressed Muslims. He separated the creedal and the political, but unlike other eighteenth century thinkers, this separation ultimately benefits the political, and fails to produce alternatives to it. His ideology was generally intolerant of many practices and beliefs of individual Muslims. In his extensive discussion of what constitutes unbelief (kufr) and the belief in more than one God (shirk), he lists numerous convictions and acts.8
Unlike other 18th century reformers, the initial Wahhabi movement mainly focused on matters of belief. It thus contained the potential of universal reform from its very beginning. Although scholarly influences connect the Wahhabi movement to the earlier Kadızadelis of the Osmanli territories, the shift from socio-political and legal reform to theological reform was decisive. Alongside the strategic alliance with the Sa‘ud family, the theological shift was one of the main reasons for the enduring influence of Wahhabism in the Muslim lands. While other movements strove to reform society and promote scholarly unification by tolerance for the richness of the Islamic tradition, the narrow, but politically explosive, doctrine of tawhid and takfir distinguished the historical impact of Wahhabism. The theological reform took it beyond the regional and temporal activities of the other 18th century movements.
After looking at the historical predecessors as well as the contemporaries to the Wahhabi reform, one may wonder about the connection between these movements. Many contemporary academics have tried to support the thesis of autonomous reform movements, independent of the impact of European modernity, by referring to the informal network of scholars in the 18th century Haramayn (Makka and Madina).9 Influential as this trans-regional network of teachers and students may have been, the main characteristic of the early reform movements was nevertheless that they drew on local traditions of learning in relation to particular socio-political issues. Only later did they developed beyond the regional character. As Dallal writes:
The various universal visions of eighteenth century thinkers had their roots in earlier regional traditions. Along with many peripatetic scholars who travelled in the eighteenth century in pursuit of knowledge, the major thinkers of the eighteenth century either travelled after their ideas matured and their views were articulated or they did not travel at all, and they were educated within deeply rooted regional traditions. It is thus possible to speak of an Indian school of thought, a Yemeni school and a West African one. It is perhaps even possible to claim that groundbreaking intellectual contributions were made within the context of mature and erudite regional traditions, whereas the intellectual contributions of travelling, apprentice scholars, important as they were from a social perspective, were derivative. The regional rootedness of the main reform traditions, however, does not imply that their intellectual horizons were limited or parochial. Quite the contrary, regional traditions were revitalised by opening them up to the legacies of other Muslim regions and schools of thought. Although eighteenth century thought introduced significant departures from traditional epistemologies, these departures were generated from within the tradition and did not derive from alternative cultural systems.10
The reform thinkers shared a universal Islamic intellectual tradition, but addressed the problems of their times in different ways and therefore took on distinct regional characters. That is, however, not to say that the regional movements were nationalistic in character. They all appeared before the spread of the idea of nation states in the Muslim lands and cannot be associated with the later discourse of nationalism. Returning to the scholarly network around Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Mehmet Currie suggests:
Given the similarities in their militant approaches against religious innovations, the influence of al-Ustuwani and the Kadızadelı movement in Damascus where the teachers of Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab studied, the tight chronology of one movement disappearing (1730s) in the Ottoman heartlands and the other movement appearing (1740s) in Najd, some direct transmission of teachings appears very likely.11
Regardless of the actual impact of the scholarly network on the formation of Wahhabism, certain similarities are evident. In fact, the scholarship of Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab bears numerous similarities to the Hanbali circles of Damascus, which had inherited important aspects of the earlier Kadızadeli movement. Among them, the reliance on the works of Ibn Taymiyya and his student Ibn al-Qayyim. The main differences was the shift from law to belief, or fiqh to ‘aqida, as the prime focus of reform. Although the exchange between leading scholars in the Haramayn might have influenced certain aspects of their reform, such as the revisiting of Islamic scholarship beyond the boundaries of the madhhabs, their interests were initially regional in character. As the cultural and technological impact of modernity spread in the Muslim lands, however, the reform movements went beyond their regional origins. By the 19th century spread of nation-state politics, secular universities, mass printing, journalism and similar phenomena in the Muslim world, new platforms for religious and political reform appeared, shaping both the ideological content and its effect on Muslims societies. Most of the remaining movements turned into universal reform movements, a development which since then has characterised most reform initiatives.
To conclude, while most early movements were regional in character and focused on socio-political reform by means of traditional scholarship, Wahhabism turned into a universal reform movement because of their focus on theology and the alliance with the Sa‘ud family. By using the Wahhabi ideology for political purposes, the Sa‘ud family managed to navigate through the disintegrating Osmanlı caliphate and firmly establish their new state upon the Wahhabi doctrines. Likewise, the followers of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab made use of the Sa‘ud family for similar purposes. The strategic alliance proved to be the decisive feature that distinguished the Wahhabi movement from other contemporary reforms.
Reformers such as Shah Wali Allah, ‘Uthman don Fodio and as-Sanûsi responded to political and intellectual challenges by self-confident revivals of scholarship in the socio-political arena. Although they impacted on the developments in their particular regions, none of them initially shared the modernist claim of universal reform. In other words, they did not invalidate other interpretations of the traditional body of scholarship, but upheld to a larger degree the richness and diversity of the scholarly transmission since the first generations of Muslims. The Wahhabi reform may therefore be described as an exception, rather than the norm of Islamic reform in the 18th century. It also became, perhaps due to that reason, one of the few movements whose ideology continued to influence Muslim scholars and societies after the cultural impact of European modernity in the 19th century onwards.
We thereby reach the end of today’s lecture and next week’s lecture will pick up from where we ended today, examining history of the second stage of modern reformism, exemplified by the reform movements that began in Egypt towards the end of the 19th century. Recommended reading in relation to this lecture include Ahmad S. Dallal’s article “The origins and early development of Islamic reform” in The New Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 6 (2010) and Mehmet Curries lecture from last year’s course entitled “The Osmanli Khalifate II” (2012). For the upcoming lecture, we recommend Indira Falk Gesink’s Islamic Reformism and Conservatism (2009). Thank you for your attention.
Currie, Mehmet 2012. “The Osmanli Khalifate II”. Lecture delivered 10/11/2012 at the Muslim Faculty of Advanced Studies, Norwich.
Dallal, Ahmad S. 2010. “The origins and early development of Islamic reform” in The New Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 6. Muslims and Modernity Culture and Society since 1800. Edited by Robert W. Hefner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Doumani, Beshara 1995. Discovering Palestine: Merchants and peasants in Jebal Nablus, 1700-1900. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fattah, Hala 1997. The politics of regional trade in Iraq, Arabia, and the Gulf, 1745-1900. Albany: State University of New York.
Gibb, H. A. R., Bowen H. 1950. Islamic society and the West: A study of the impact of Western civilization on Moslem culture in the Near East, vol. I: Islamic society in the eighteenth century. Parts 1 and 2. London: Oxford University Press.
Holt, P. M., Lambton, Ann K. S., Lewis, B. (eds.) 1970. The Cambridge history of Islam, vol. IA, The central Islamic lands from pre Islamic times to the First World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hourani, A. 1983. Arabic thought in the liberal age, 1798-1939. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Islamoglu, H. (ed.) 1987. The Ottoman Empire and the world economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kasaba, R. 1988. The Ottoman Empire and the world economy: The nineteenth century. Albany: State University of New York.
Khoury, Dina 1997. State and provincial society in the early modern Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rahman, Fazlur 1970. “Revival and reform in Islam”, in M. Holt, A. K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis (eds.), The Cambridge history of Islam, 2 vols. Cambridge, 1970).
Voll, John O. 1992. Islam: Continuity and change in the modern world. Boulder: Syracuse University Press.
1 Cf. Gibb and Bowen 1950:7; Holt, Lambton and Lewis 1970; Hourani 1983.
2 Cf. Dallal 2010: 107 for a further discussion.
3 Cf. Islamoglu 1987; Kasaba 1988; Doumani 1995; Fattah, 1997; Khoury 1997.